Institutionalizing Violence by Jerome Drevon

Author:Jerome Drevon [Drevon, Jerome]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Published: 2022-06-27T22:00:00+00:00

This episode suggests that, at the beginning of the cycle of contention with the regime, the IG’s internal institutionalization prevented further radicalization and helped the group to take advantage of the deteriorating environment. The presence of relatively strong leaders prevented a reiteration of hasty actions against the regime, which sharply contrasted with JG cells.

Weak institutionalization conversely made the JG more susceptible to outbidding with the security services. Although group members were not directly targeted like the IG, the conflict between the IG and the regime stimulated the mobilization of many individuals loosely tied to JG networks who were caught in indiscriminate arrests of Islamist militants. Their networks were not centralized around a central leadership and hierarchical structure, as in the IG, but mostly converged upon geographic areas. Their members wanted to retaliate against the regime and the security services based on their personal experiences in the ongoing conflict with the security services. The absence of socialization with a strongly institutionalized group, reflecting the JG’s weak value infusion and systemness, explains their tactical preferences for immediate action as opposed to the development of a long-term approach. It also contextualizes their fragmentation and ambiguous organizational belonging. Many JG members were frustrated at the failure of their leadership to act against the regime. Some of them therefore decided to strike back and selectively attack those they deemed responsible for their arrests.

Outbidding with the security services therefore started with JG cells and not the larger IG. This is paradoxical, since the IG was the main target of repression. Clashes with the security services antagonized JG members not fully under the control of the group’s leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Weak internal institutionalization explains sporadic and localized acts of violence that the IG initially managed to prevent. Two networks, later referred to as al-shawqiyyun and najimun min al-nar (the returnees from hellfire) by the media,6 were involved. They were organized around limited geographical networks and were acting in isolation. The first group was led by Shawqi al-Sheikh, a formerly JG-affiliated militant who radicalized his religious views and distanced himself from the JG according to Majdi Salim (2013) and Nabil Naʿim (2014). Shawqi opposed the government and increasingly excommunicated outsiders as well (Munib, 2009: 95–99). The two main operations of the shawqiyyun targeted two people in particular, Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad ʿAla and Muhammad ʿAwda, who were blamed for targeting Islamist opponents and torturing detainees. Similarly, the group later denounced under the name najimun min al-nar hailed from a limited geographic area and was led by a former JG associate, Majdi Safti, who similarly distanced himself from the group (Munib, 2009: 92). In 1987, Safti’s group organized a few targeted operations against two former ministers of the interior, Hassan Abu Basha and Al-Nabawi Ismaʿil, and a journalist considered close to the government, Mukarram Muhammad Ahmad. Other targeted attacks were also orchestrated by some individuals who were affected by repression, such as the killing of Lieutenant Colonel ʿIssam Shams by Muhammad Ahmad, after being tortured by the former in prison, according to al-Zawahiri (2010: 90–91).

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.